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Background
A protection profde (l?P) states assumptions about the TOE (Target of Evaluation), identifies threats to the TOE based on the assumptions, gives security goals to counter the threats, and finally identifies security fknctions to satisfy the security goals. A rationale section serves to explain why various decisions were made. A final section generalizes this PP to any applicationlayer protocol.
It is expected that the TOE will be developed by a third party as a COTS solution. The customer will not be able to control the development environment. Any testing by the customer will likely be done after deliveryof the TOE by the developer. Qualitatively,the level of protection that can be provided in this sort of environment is at evaluation assurance level (ML) 2.
Objectives of EAL2 (The objectives are taken from ISO/IEC 15408-3:1999(E)): EAL2 requires the co-operation of the developer in terms of the deliveryof design information and test results, but should not demand more effort on the part of the developer than is consistent with good commercial practice. As such it should not require a substantiallyincreased investment of cost or time.
EAL2 is therefore applicable in those circumstances where developers or users require a low to moderate level of independently assured security in the absence of ready availabilityof the complete development record. Such a situation may arise when securing legacy systems, or where access to the developer may be limited. Kgwmk tele-control, electric power, network security, information protocol, MMS
PP Overview
The purpose of the TASE.2 PP is to define the basic security requirements for electric power utilities exchanging information using the TASE,2 protocol.
Target of Evaluation (TOE) Description
The puipose of TASE.2 is to provide inter-utility real-time data exchange using a client-server model. Either the client or server utilitymay initiate a connection. Interactions bemeen a client and semer can consist of reques~for information as well as the issuance of control directives. In this sense, TASE.2 is the extension of monitoring and control from a local, or intra-SCADA, environment to an inter-SCADA environment. Consider the following figure.
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TOE Security Environment
PP-Compliant TOES are to be used in an electric power utility environment where business sensitive information is processed but classified information is not processed. Hence, the information will be valued as proprietary to the business. Consequently, we will assume that the most likely adversary will be competitors or entities with competitive interests including professionals as well as knowledgeable amateurs. We include in the phrase "entities with a competitive interest" those whose goal is to discredit the company. Several distinguishing features between a professiord and an amateur include the level of resources available as well as the systematic nature of the attack. Due to the intet-relation between business and certain governments, it is possible that a list of competitors will include government affdiates with substantial resources. Such threats require a higher level of protection than is provided in this profde. It is assumed that threats come from adversarieswith only moderate resources.
In what follows an insider is defined to be an authenticated user. The insiders are authenticated prior to interaction with the TOE by some mechanism outside the TOE. Outsiders are anyone who is not an insider. 
Assumptions

Assumption Name
Security Policy Issues
Policy Name P.ACCESS P.CO&iPLY
P<TOE-HOST
Description ] Comments
Access rights to specific data objects are determined by object attributes assigned to that object, user identity, user attributes, and environmental conditions as defined by the security policy. The implementation and use of the organization's IT systems must comply with all applicable laws, regulations, and contractual agreements imposed on the organization. System administrators that set ] security policy for the system on which the TOE resides authenticate the users. The security algorithms chosen to meet these objectives will be at a level so that it is computationally improbable for an adversary to obtain the secret hidden by the algorithm. The TOE provides services that allow the ability to validate the source of the data. Note that source integrity implicitly provides data authentication since if the data has been changed so has the source. The TOE provides semices to ensure uniqueness and timeliness guarantees on data. 2 There is a concern that the security fimctions defined by the CC are not sufficiently resolved to meet the security objectives. The objectives include data integrity, transactionintegrity, data authentication,and source authentication.Source authenticationloosely maps to non-repudiation of origin (FCO_iNRO), but nonrepudiation is not the only reason one would want source authentication. Consequently, the two should be distinguished.Some of the objectives should apply to both static data and data in transmissioneven though FDP_DAU refers only to data thatis static.
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